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THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
THE NEED FOR ANTITRUST LAWS IN THE
CARIBBEAN AND THEIR ACTUAL OR
POSSIBLE IMPACT ON TRADE
Alan A. Ransom*
INTRODUCTION
It is my privilege to talk with you today on the application of
antitrust principles to Caribbean countries. The antitrust concepts I will
use are basic - conduct and structure.' By that I mean conduct such as
price-fixing, territorial allocation, tie-ins and the like, on the one hand,
and merger policy on the other. I will discuss these in the context of two
economic areas - export-import issues and internal island economic
problems.
Let me first give the standard governmental disclaimer. I speak for no
one but myself. My views are my own and not those of the Subcommittee
or any of its Members. This is perhaps an application of the Caribbean
* Counsel to the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives. The views
expressed are solely those of the author and any errors, omissions or remarks
considered overly outspoken are solely the responsibility of the author. The author
gratefully acknowledges the comments and criticisms of William Sippel, counsel,
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States House of Representatives; William Gilmore and J.P. Fonteyne, both
former colleagues at the University of the West Indies Faculty of Law, Barbados,
W.I.
1. W. MUELLER, A PRIMER ON MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION (1970).
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saying that "the higher up the pole the monkey go ... ."; or, as Eddie
Laing reminded me when we were discussing my remarks, there is
another Caribbean saying which begins, "Jackass will jump and bray
I try not to hedge what I say with obscurantist phrases such as "it
would seem as though," or "it might perhaps be argued that," so I hope
you will understand that I mean no offense if I sometimes sound overly
dogmatic. Finally, my viewpoint is, for the moment, that of an attorney
for some hypothetical Caribbean nation.
I do not believe that standard United States antitrust principles, or
for that matter antitrust concepts current in Great Britain, Canada or the
Common Market, can or should apply across the board to the Caribbean
Countries and their economic problems. These concepts deserve study but
without modifications dictated by regional realities, they will not prove
very useful.
There are, in my view, three major Caribbean economic problems.
First, internal prices for many basic commodities and staples are very
high. Second, Caribbean nations have difficulty exporting their products
- raw materials or finished goods - in the face of sophisticated
competition from what I call the overdeveloped countries, and the cost of
getting materials into the Caribbean is very high. These latter two
problems are interrelated and I will treat them together. Finally, merger
policy is complicated by geographical factors.
HIGH INTERNAL PRICES
Turning to the first issue - that of the internal price of commodities
and staples - I am sure no one will dispute the argument that, whatever
the cause, these prices are in many cases exorbitant.
2
In a large, diffuse and dynamic economy such as that found in the
United States, prices are theoretically subject to the buffeting forces of
competition. We all know, of course, that even in the United States this is
not necessarily true. There are monopolies - many of them government-
mandated or encouraged - and there are numerous markets in which
brand names and product identification have created very high barriers
to entry.
3
2. Rubin, Competition Policy and the Caribbean Community, 9 J.W.T.L. 398,
404 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rubin].
3. This theory is the framework for the Federal Trade Commission's suit
against the three (Quaker Oats having been dropped as a respondent on February
24, 1978) major cereal manufacturers. The FTC alleges that a shared monopoly has
existed in a large and growing market which has seen no new entrants because of
brand proliferation, product differentiation supported by intensive advertising,
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In a smaller economy, however, particularly one dependent on
imported necessities, the small scale can magnify imperfect competition,
and a monopoly can be more quickly formed and entrenched. Certain
facets of some island economies, for example, are controlled by the
remains of old plantocracies. These, in some cases, have evolved into
vertically-integrated distributional monopolies, either over desirable
brand names or over a type of commodity.
4
The theoretical solution in cases where natural competition will not
work - and I stress the word theoretical - is price regulation based on
disclosure of costs and profits. However, this solution runs into a host of
philosophical and socioeconomic roadblocks that are ingrained in
Caribbean societies5 and even more deeply ingrained in the United
States.
Furthermore, in a small country with less population and a smaller
economic universe, the challenge to price-gouging or monopoly-
profiterring is not likely to come completely from the injured private
sector, especially in view of the traditional Caribbean reluctance to use
the law as a means of challenging established practices of any kind.
To solve these problems, Caribbean governments should, as a matter
of economic and social policy, have statutory power to examine profit
margins, shipping charges, mark-ups and the general state of competi-
tion in certain sectors of the economy. This should, of course, apply most
forcefully to natural monopolies or government-granted monopolies, such
as power companies, telephone companies and the like.6 It should also
apply over the broad range of consumer necessaries, although there are
obvious definitional problems presented here.
I realize that these ideas are an anathema to anyone who considers
him or herself a classical, free-market capitalist. But the plain fact is that
it is extremely doubtful whether many nations on this good earth -
particularly smaller island nations - can play by the rules of that
classical game and win, or simply stay even. These rules have been
and shelf-space allocation programs. Kellogg Co., FTC Docket No. 8883, Transcript
at 2760, et seq. (1972). Even if the case is proven, problems of relief are significant.
One suggestion has been to treat advertising expenses for entrenched brands as a
capital item rather than as an expense. See Weiss, Advertising, Profits, and
Corporate Taxes, 51 REv. EcoN. & STATISTICS 421 (1969).
4. See Rubin, supra note 2, at 404. While there are, of course, countervailing
considerations, see also the discussion at the conclusion of Part IV - some
Caribbean governmental policies such as tax relief for new businesses and tariffs
for competing goods help preserve entrenched market power.
5. Id. at 400.
6. See H. BREWSTER, WAGE POLICY ISSUES IN AN UNDERDEVELOPED
ECONOMY: TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO (1969) [hereinafter cited as Brewster].
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arbitrarily applied to much of the globe by the overdeveloped countries. If
this is taken as a given, and there are some Caribbean nations that would
agree with this, then a limitation of the amount of profit that can be
extracted from a finite number of people with low incomes is a reasonable
social and economic policy that ought to be implemented.
As the government of Barbados has put it:
The main danger [with regard to high prices charged for basic
consumer goods] so far as under-developed countries are concerned is
that elasticity of demand and supply (i.e., the ease with which
demand and supply respond to price changes) may be so low that the
price system may become relatively ineffective - thus an increase in
demand for a commodity sometimes elicits no increase in output
because in the given period supply is fixed - hence prices increase
considerably. Where income levels are low, moreover, a decrease in
price produces no increased consumption because the limited number
of buyers does not expand consumption at lower prices and no more
buyers are added to their numbers.7
In fact, in a setting where the expansion of the market is so small
that a given product or brand cannot reasonably be expected to be
provided by more than one local outlet, standard notions of competition
may not work. The buying power of the community may be so small that
attempts by government regulation to force a product or brand to be
distributed by more than one outlet may be counterproductive, forcing
several companies to invest in the purchase of independent supplies of the
same item, thus causing an overall excessive supply. This will mean that
the items will not sell as fast as they should; money will be tied up for too
long; there will be a need for larger profit margins on fewer items sold on
longer-term financing; and the result will be higher, rather than lower,
consumer prices as a result of enforced, artificial competition.
But none of these issues can be resolved without adequate informa-
tion. There is a method for implementing the information disclosure
necessary to achieve the competition policy decided upon by the
Caribbean nations. It is the Line of Business Program instituted by the
FTC in 1972,8 or more accurately, a Caribbean version thereof.
If one of the antitrust enforcement agencies of the most developed
country in the world thinks there is reasonable ground for obtaining such
7. MINISTRY OF TRADE AND LABOUR (Barbados), PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF
THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AND MARKETS 7-8 (1965).
8. See Long, FTC Memorandum: Collection of Line of Business Data for 1977
(May 9, 1977); FTC, Supporting Statement, from LB, 1974 Survey Version (July 1,
1975).
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detailed information concerning "the organization, business, conduct,
practices and management of any person, partnership or corporation
engaged in. . . commerce" 9 in the United States, as is sought in the Line
of Business Program, the same reasoning should a fortiori apply in a
country where individual items or lines of business are fewer, where they
have a more profound impact on its citizens and where much less
economic data is available.
The FTC Program was motivated by several factors. Two of the most
important were the diversification and merger waves in the 1960s, with a
consequent serious loss of information on industrial performance. In
many cases (such as synthetic rubber, soaps and detergents, turbo-
generators, refrigerators, washing machines, electric lamps and storage
batteries), the Commission was of the opinion that "it is virtually
impossible to obtain accurate statistics on financial performance because
all or most of the leading producers are highly diversified corporations
whose financial reports are not broken down to provide such informa-
tion."10
Schedule 3 of the Line of Business questionnaire is designed to elicit
"gross margin, contribution margin, and operating income figures
[which] measure various dimensions of price structure and profitability,
with important implications for the efficiency with which markets
allocate resources to meet consumer demand."'" The schedule also seeks
to obtain media advertising expenditures, selling expenses, research and
development expenses and other information designed to judge the
economic performance of an industry. The Line of Business reports are
designed to pinpoint industries of persistently high profitability. Needless
to say, to many in the United States, this smacks of incipient government
control and radical socialism, and the requests for data have been bitterly
litigated.' 2
Caribbean nations are economic microcosms, and the logical case for
a similar program in the Caribbean is very compelling. I do not mean to
minimize the difficulty of this. Many influential companies in the
9. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, § 6; 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (1976). This is
extremely broad power. The operative provision is § 5: "Unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976).
10. FTC, Supporting Statements, supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. See A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 417 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Del. 1976). In re FTC
Corporate Patterns Report Litigation, 1977-1 TRADE REP. (CCH) 61,399. The
Corporate Patterns Program differs from the Line of Business Program in that the
former is more narrowly focused on sales by product lines, and not profits by
product lines.
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Caribbean are multinational and they doubtless would view with extreme
disfavor any country that instituted such a program. 13 Furthermore, there
exists the problem of obtaining information located in another country.
This is a political and legal problem with which I shall not here attempt
to deal. But the logical case for obtaining such data is compelling.
Such a Line of Business approach would have beneficial effects in
several areas. First, Caribbean economists would be able to more
accurately assess the state of their island economies, and collective efforts
such as CARICOM would be facilitated. A uniform disclosure law,
carefully controlled as to access and the use to which the data is put,
would also have a salutary effect on import-export policy, to which I shall
turn in a moment.
In many cases, market competition is a direct function of market
structure. Very little is known of monopoly elements in the Caribbean
economy. As one author has put it: "[It is ironic that even though the
disparate economies in the region all indicate strong monopolistic
tendencies, there is almost no evidence available that places the burden of
such poor performance on highly concentrated market structures."'14 In a
word, it is simply impossible for West Indian economists to do industry-
by-industry analyses because they do not have adequate data.
13. See, e.g., Seers, A Step Towards A Political Economy of Development, 18
Soc. ECON. STUD. 217, 249 (1969).
14. Rubin, supra note 2. As Connor and Mueller have put it:
Three key determinants of the degree of competition in a market are the
level of market concentration, the relative market position of the individual
firm, and the barriers facing new competitors wishing to enter the market.
The analysis confirmed that each of these factors had a significant impact
on MNC [Multinational Corporations] profitability in both Brazil and
Mexico. The profits of MNC affiliates were higher when they operated in
markets where a few firms dominated the market. This is consistent with
the theory of oligopoly that firms compete less vigorously in markets of few
sellers than many sellers. Similarly, profits were higher for firms holding
dominant positions in the market (as measured by their share of the
market compared to their leading rivals) than for those holding lesser
positions. Finally, profits were higher for firms when entry barriers created
by product differentiation (as measured by advertising-to-sales ratios) were
larger than when they were low.
J. CONNOR & W. MUELLER, MARKET POWER AND PROFITABILITY OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPS. IN BRAZIL AND MEXICO, REPORT TO SUBCOMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1977).
See also R. NEWFARMER & W. MUELLER, MULTINATIONAL CORPS. IN
BRAZIL AND MEXICO: STRUCTURAL SOURCES OF ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC
POWER, REPORT TO SUBCOMMITTEE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977).
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NECESSITY FOR THOROUGH EXAMINATION OF
EXPORT-IMPORT PROBLEMS
The export business of the Caribbean is complicated by the fact that
no one nation can export enough of anything to significantly affect world
markets or market prices. In other words, output is simply too small to
make a dent in anything. This is so, for example, even with respect to
bauxite in Jamaica or oil in Venezuela. Theoretically, the simple answer
is to cartelize. I realize that, coming from an antitrust lawyer, this sounds
like heresy, but you must remember that antitrust concepts tend to be
molded by those who are applying them. If you have the bad end of a
cartel you rage and scream and call it a price-fixing. However, if you are
too low, you talk in terms of "the orderly marketing of goods" and the
beneficial effects of cartels.
United States cartel law contains some very subtle variations.15 One
is that we tend to modify our legal position when faced with a strong
cartel such as the oil cartel. The reason for this is rooted in both law and
economics. The legal rationale is that it is often difficult to obtain
jurisdiction over, or to enforce a judgment against, a foreign corporation,
particularly if it is a quasi-governmental entity. The economic rationale
(and the diplomatic and national security reasons) are more important.
Using oil as an example, it is better to modify your antitrust concepts
than to freeze in the dark.
As another example, the consent decree in the Bechtel case16 makes it
very clear that some types of boycotts are extremely complex, and
15. See generally Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses:
Transnational Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1976);
Joelson & Griffin, The Legal Status of Nation-State Cartels Under United States
Antitrust and Public International Law, 9 INT'L LAW. 617 (1975); Victor,
Multinational Corporations: Antitrust Extraterritoriality and the Prospect of
Immunity, 8 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 11 (1973); DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Guide: Antitrust and
International Operations, 1977 TRADE REP. (CCH) No. 266 PART II [hereinafter
cited as DEP'T. OF JUSTICE Guide]. Speech by Farmer during Seminar on Antitrust
Problems and Restrictive Business Practices in Latin America (Cleveland, Ohio,
June 8, 1977); See also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602
(1978) et seq.; U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, Domestic and International Business
Administration - Restrictive Trade Practices or Boycotts, Proposed Rules, 42 Fed.
Reg. 48,556 (Sept. 23, 1977).
16. United States v. Bechtel Corp., No. C-76-99 (D. N. Cal., filed Jan. 16,
1976). The relief requested in the original complaint consisted of four short
paragraphs. The final proposed decree, entered into without testimony, trial or
adjudication, runs to ten Kantian pages. See Comment in Opposition to Proposed
Consent Judgment No. C-76-99 (GBN, April 14, 1977) (comments of Congresswo-
man Holtzman, et al.)
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consequently, attempts to prevent them are almost unenforceable. On the
other hand, there is the prosecution of the uranium price-fixing cartel
both by private parties 7 as plaintiffs and the United States govern-
ment.18 Traditionally, such suits are complicated by diplomatic considera-
tions. For example, the British have protested the actions of American
antitrust enforcers obtaining British documents and testimony from
British officials.' 9 This is natural enough as governments do not like to
have their sanctioned cartels examined by some other government. The
Canadian government in effect politely told the U.S. government
investigators of the uranium cartel to get very lost;2° so did the
Australians. 21 The United States, however, is quite capable of forming
export cartels of its own and frequently does.2 2 It may be that a common
17. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., et al v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., No. 75-250-C6
(D. Kan., filed Oct. 1, 1975); In re Westinghouse, MDL Docket 235 [1977] 3 All E.R.
703.
18. Grand Jury Investigation of the Uranium Industry No. 76-0128 (D. Colo.,
1977).
19. The House of Lords forbade the discovery requested by the United States,
Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse, MDL Docket 235, [19781 1 All E.R. 434. (The
decision involved five other appeals as well.)
As Viscount Dilhorne put it:
For many years now the United States has sought to exercise
jurisdiction over foreigners in respect of acts done outside the jurisdiction
of that country. This is not in accordance with international law and has
led to legislation on the part of other States, including the United
Kingdom, designed to protect their nationals from criminal proceedings in
foreign courts where the claims to jurisdiction by those courts are excessive
and constitute an invasion of sovereignty.
Id. at 21.
20. In re Application for Judicial Review, pursuant to The Judicial Review
Procedure Act, STAT. 0. & R., Chap. 48 (Sup. Ct. Ont., Toronto Weekly Ct., Released
Nov. 9, 1977).
21. Foreign Proceedings Act (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) No. 121, ACTS
AUSTL. P. 1976. Ever forthright, the Australians simply entitled the legislation,
"An Act to Make Provision for Preventing the Prohibition of Certain Documents,
and the Giving of Certain Evidence, for the Purposes of Proceedings in Foreign
Courts."
22. This is the purpose of the Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. § 61, et.
seq. (1973). Indeed, the DEP'T OF JUSTICE Guide, supra note 5, at 7 reads:
By contrast, to apply the Sherman Act to a combination of United States
firms for foreign activities which have no direct or intended effect on
United States consumers or export opportunities would, we believe, extend
the Act beyond the point Congress must have intended. This could
encroach upon the sovereignty of a foreign state without any overriding
justification based on legitimate United States interests. In fact, antitrust
laws and enforcement programs various foreign nations have adopted (or
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
export cartel - if it is an answer - is the answer. Other possibilities
include combining with cartels from other parts of the world that export
goods to the United States, or doing the same within a regional group
such as CARICOM.
On the import side, the major problem is the effect of import cartels,
viz., those imposed by carriers. Although they are legal, rate-making
conferences are a particularly egregious form of price-fixing. The nations
of the Caribbean are natural victims of the simple fact that most of what
they need to import has to come by ship. The United States Department
of Justice, as part of a very strong move to eliminate certain antitrust
exemptions and to eliminate regulatory inefficiency, has been vigorously
filing briefs before the Federal Maritime Commission taking the position
that certain rate-making practices are anticompetitive1 3 In fact, the
could adopt) may offer a more direct means for redressing unreasonable
trade restraints which have their primary impact on the residents of those
jurisdictions, but have no significant impact on United States consumer
interests and export opportunities. 16
Footnote 16 to the Guide reads:
The U.S. Government is a party to voluntary guidelines which discourage
participation by international businesses (including U.S. Businesses) in
anticompetitive trade practices wherever they occur. See Code of Conduct
for Multinational Enterprises adopted by the Council of the Committee on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (June 1976). The United
States is committed to a program of cooperation with foreign antitrust
agencies, including joint efforts to improve the enforcement efforts of each
participating nation under its own national law. See, e.g., Agreement
between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Relating to Mutual
Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, signed June 23,
1976. In addition, the Department of Justice has been, and will continue to
be, quite active in urging governmental bodies to be less restrictive in
regulating international trade where public goals can be served by less
restrictive measures.
There is no reason why Caribbean governments could not engage in similar
cooperative efforts.
23. See, e.g., Comments of the United States Dep't of Justice Before the
Federal Maritime Commission on Agreement No. 57-109 - Application of Pacific
Westbound Conference For Extension of Agreement, 57-96 (Jan. 30, 1978). The
"benefits" assented to by the carriers are:
1. The elimination of a multiplicity of competing tariffs;
2. The development of intermodalism through the conference system;
3. The creation of uniform tariff rules; and
4. A reduction in the potential for malpractices.
Simply stated these "benefits" translate to the elimination of price competition,
conference control over intermodal shipping, uniform charges and services, and
the power to police price-cutters. The Department of Justice took the position that
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Department has recently published a mammoth report entitled "The
Regulated Ocean Shipping Industry. '24 The conclusion read as follows:
[C]onference [rate-making] power is not effectively constrained by
market forces or by regulation . . . [TIhe evidence shows that
current regulation may well have promoted rather than hindered
cartelization of the industry.
The result has often been, instead, the creation of a monopoly
possessing all the attributes Congress sought to avoid. Government
regulation seems to have abandoned a balancing of interests in favor
of promoting 'stability' and increased cartelization of the industry.
Shipper choice and consumer welfare are subordinated to these goals
on the presumption that they are concomitantly benefited.25
Nor is this the only criticism of ocean-shipping conference practices. The
House Judiciary Committee issued a report which was just as critical of
conference rate-making practices under the earlier Federal Maritime
Board.26
There are several ways in which Caribbean nations could take
advantage of this. One involves increased public participation in United
States regulatory practice. To the extent that U.S. conference rate-making
is approved by the Federal Maritime Commission, Caribbean nations
ought to file views and opinions concerned with this practice. Second,
Caribbean nations ought to seek, through their own legislation, detailed
price, cost and profit margin information. To the extent that U.S.
legislation affects Caribbean shipping, I see nothing wrong with seeking
appropriate provisions concerning disclosure of economic information
related to shipping in that area.
Third, the United States Supreme Court has recently held in Pfizer,
Inc. v. India27 that a foreign nation is a "person" within the meaning of
the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) had no authority to approve the
agreement, or if it did, the agreement violated the standards of FMC v. Swenska
Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238 (1968).
24. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, The Regulated Ocean Shipping Industry (Jan.,
1977).
25. Id. at 237-39.
26. H.R. REP. No. 1419, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962). The Subcommittee Report
stated that it would have been consistent with Congressional policy to withdraw
the antitrust exemption because it had been abused. Id. at 385. See Monopoly
Problems in Regulated Industries: Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). These hearings are
fascinating reading. See also STEAMSHIP CONFERENCES AND DUAL RATE
CONTRACTS, S. REP. No. 860, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
27. 1978-1 TRADE REP. (CCH) 61,812 (1978). (hereinafter cited as Pfizer).
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Section 4 of the Clayton Act and may sue for treble damages under the
U.S. antitrust laws to the same extent as a domestic plaintiff. The Court,
in an opinion which is strongly supportive of antitrust principles, quoted
the earlier case of Georgia u. Evans2 s as follows:
We can perceive no reason to believe that Congress wanted to deprive
a [foreign nation], as purchaser of commodities shipped in [interna-
tional] commerce, of the civil remedy of treble damages which is
available to other purchasers who suffer through violation of the
Act .... Nothing in the Act, its history, or its policy, could justify so
restrictive a construction of the word "person" in section 7 .... Such
a construction would deny all redress to a [foreign nation], when
mulcted by a violator of the Sherman Law, merely because it is a
[foreign nation].2 9
The court also noted that this was no novel concept and that
This Court has long recognized the rule that a foreign nation is
generally entitled to prosecute any civil claim in the courts of the
United States upon the same basis as a domestic corporation or
individual might. To deny him this privilege would manifest a want
of comity and friendly feeling.30
Specifically defining its holding, the Court said,
We hold today only that a foreign nation otherwise entitled to sue in
our courts is entitled to sue for treble damages under the antitrust
laws to the same extent as any other plaintiff. Neither the fact that
the respondents are foreign nor the fact that they are sovereign is
reason to deny them the remedy of treble damages Congress afforded
to "any person" victimized by violations of the antitrust laws. 31
I suggest that this principle may be broader than the Court put it.
The Legal Advisor to the Department of State advised the Court of
28. 316 U.S. 159 (1941).
29. 1978-1 TRADE REP. (CCH) 73,375-76.
30. Id. at 73,376, quoting, The Sapphire, 11 Wall. 164, 167 (1870).
31. Id. This position is in interesting contrast to that taken in the DEP'T. OF
JUSTICE Guide, supra note 22. There, the U.S. government contends that it does not
take the position that a conspiracy affecting commerce is within the reach of the
Sherman Act, as enforced by the U.S. government. However, the Department
supported the result in Pfizer by a Memorandum as Amicus Curiae, as did the
Department of State by letter. See Pfizer, at 73,376, n.20 supra note 27. Thus, it
supports suits in the United States by foreign governments but will not bring such
an action itself. But see n.22 supra.
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Appeals that the Department would not anticipate foreign policy
problems if foreign governments were held to be "persons" within the
meaning of Section 4 of the Clayton Act. Thus, the State Department
approves of the opinion. Further, as the Court noted, the Sherman Act
specifically provides that the word "person" shall be deemed to include
corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of
either the United States, the laws of any of the territories, the laws of any
State, or the laws of any foreign country. 32 Thus, an association such as
CARICOM will have the same access to our courts. So also would a
governmentally-created importing firm, for example. That access ought to
be used, although I recognize that those trained in the British and
Caribbean legal system are somewhat more reluctant to litigate than
their U.S. brethren.
The Department of Justice also supported this broad concept. It noted
that this principle of allowing foreign sovereigns access to the courts is
"firmly imbedded in English law," citing the English Statute of
Monopolies of 1623. 33 It would be interesting to determine whether this
would extend to regulatory proceedings in the United States, tariff
hearings, etc.
MERGER POLICY - A SOCIOLOGICAL PROBLEM AS WELL
AS A LEGAL PROBLEM
Merger problems in the Caribbean are complicated by one major
factor - water. In many industries, total regional demand can be
supplied by the output of a single firm producing at its most efficient
rate. 34 What this means, of course, is that in many areas other than those
we normally think of as natural monopolies, the industry structure will be
highly concentrated and many businesses will be, in effect, natural
monopolies. Logically, this means that one applies a monopoly theory -
a natural monopoly must be price controlled. Even though ideally one
would like to have free and open competition in which, if profit margins
rise to a certain point, new investment and new businesses will be
attracted to that business, it may be that the small size of a natural
monopoly as an island economy can effectively preclude development of
its new competitor.
32. Pfizer, supra note 27.
33. Pfizer Inc. v. India, No. 76-749, (U.S. S.Ct.), Memorandum for United
States as Amicus Curiae on Writ of Certiorari, at 7, n.8.
34. See generally Tyler, Export Promotion with Increasing Returns to Scale
Under Imperfect Domestic Market Conditions, 18 Soc. ECON. STUD. 402 (1969);
Helleiner, Manufactured Exports from Less Developed Countries and Multina-
tional Firms, 83 ECON. J. 21 (1973).
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While the normal theory is that competition within an integrated
economic system is greater than it is within a purely national framework,
this picture is complicated within the Caribbean by high transportation
costs. Thus, for example, if a natural monopoly for product X is in, let us
say, Trinidad and Tobago, the shipping costs for that product will vary
depending upon where it is being shipped, and the price at the point
where the shipping costs is highest may be so high as to invite the entry
of a local firm. This obviously is good, but then one runs into the problem
that if the price of that commodity is fixed too low, the necessary
investment to enter may be so high that it is not possible to recover one's
investment within a reasonable time. Thus, what you have is a situation
in which the firstcomer gets all. You can see that the theoretical problems
in such a situation, to say nothing of the regulatory and administrative
problems, are astronomical.
Given the finite scope of Caribbean economies, it makes sense, if the
decision is that competition is maintainable in a given area, to prohibit
certain mergers. However, the basis of this type of decision in a small
economy, should be broader than the standard "relevant line of
commerce" inquiry made in the United States. As a social policy, it can be
decided simply that certain mergers should not occur.
In fact, U.S. merger law leaves room for such analysis. In Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States,3 5 the Supreme Court said:
[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition
through the protection of viable, small, locally-owned businesses.
Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might
result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It
resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization.
We must give effect to that decision.36
At this point, it is worth using this philosophical concept to ask a
more fundamental question bearing on basic notions of competition,
monopoly and antitrust in the Caribbean. Given the unemployment
situation in the West Indies, the seasonal character of part of the
employment and the lack of significant possibilities for creating
additional employment (because of the lack of natural resources and
skilled labor), it may make socioeconomic sense to keep in operation
business ventures which, in non-island areas, would be considered
marginally, or even sub-marginally, efficient. In other words, are
35. 370 U.S. 294 (1961).
36. Id. at 344.
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concepts such as cost-benefit analysis and profit margins really relevant
in geographically restricted areas such as the islands of the Caribbean,
particularly when one considers that the only alternative to a low-
efficiency service business might well be no service at all?
There are a number of vehicles for accomplishing whatever goals the
governments of the West Indies may set. Modification of the Companies
Acts would be one. In this context, authors have noted serious deficiencies
in the present Caribbean Companies Acts.3 7 For my part, I will content
myself with the suggestion that automatic exemptions for certain private
corporations, particularly where those private corporations control
tremendous wealth, is inappropriate. It also makes little sense to use
outmoded or inapplicable British or American models which were never
intended for, and bear little or no relationship to, West Indian economic
problems. This is just not sensible.
It would also be of benefit, with regard to both internal Caribbean
antitrust principles and litigation abroad, that some thought be given to
modernizing fee concepts to some limited extent. Although contingent
fees are now allowed in Barbados and Jamaica, current fee practice in the
West Indies generally discourages litigation. There are some areas,
directly related to economic problems, where this is disadvantageous,
simply because you want a firm with the ability to abuse its market
position to have concern for what it does in the marketplace. Thought
should be given to any concepts which encourage the private sector to
police itself. For example, it might be possible to split fees between the
parties evenly if the plaintiff survives a motion for summary judgment, or
each could pay his own. I realize that these ideas will not sit well with
many who are trained in the concepts of British law. But many of those
concepts simply have no bearing to the realities of West Indian economic
life.
CONCLUSION
There are significant underlying problems of national psyche as well.
As J.P. Fonteyne pointed out in a private criticism of this paper, given the
transnational nature of entire sectors of the economy of most West Indian
nations - whether it be shipping, transportation, import of consumer
goods or export of raw materials - it is apparent that any attempt to
regulate economic activities in the area, particularly by reference to such
issues as competition, transfer pricing and taxation, will have to take
their aspects of the region's economic structure into consideration.
Cooperation between the governments of the States in the area is an
37. Rubin, supra note 2, at 402.
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essential prerequisite for successful management of the region's economy.
Such cooperation will be needed both in the formulation of uniform
policies and regulations and in their enforcement.
While CARICOM would be an ideal vehicle for the delicate
negotiations that will be required to achieve the necessary inter-
governmental consensus on goals and methods, the States in the
Caribbean are nearly all newly independent nations and their recently
acquired freedom, coming in the wake of centuries of foreign rule, may
prove to be a psychological hurdle making it extremely difficult for
political leaders and for the general population alike to give up even a
fraction of the self-determination they have taken so long to acquire.
38
38. See F. KNIGHT, THE CARIBBEAN - THE GENESIS OF A FRAGMENTED
NATIONALISM (1978).
